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The Gazprom's european soccer problem

From Uefa to Schalke 04, Russian gas, thanks to staggering sponsorships, has been a protagonist of the international fields for more than a decade.

The Gazprom's european soccer problem From Uefa to Schalke 04, Russian gas, thanks to staggering sponsorships, has been a protagonist of the international fields for more than a decade.

The Russian invasion in Ukraine has inevitably involved the world of soccer, which has always been tied by a double thread to geopolitics. It is today's news that Uefa has decided to move the venue of the Champions League final from the Gazprom Arena to St. Petersburg, a painful but inevitable choice, and one that marks the third final moved in the last three years. The St. Petersburg final, however, was a special one, to be played in a special stadium. In fact, it would have been the celebration of the relationship between Uefa and Gazprom, the main sponsor of the most important football competition on the continent. A partnership that has distant origins, and that over the years has grown to become a source of over 40 million dollars a year for Uefa's coffers. In exchange, the Gazprom logo has become a constant presence during Champions League matches, normalizing for spectators the brand that ensures over 40% of gas supplies in Europe. 

Gazprom is in fact a subsidiary of the Russian government that is responsible for the extraction of natural gas, especially in the Baltic Sea, and its distribution outside of Russia. In particular to Western Europe thanks to Nord Stream and Nord Stream 2, two connections made through the Baltic Sea that connect Russia with Germany. An operation that took several years and was carried out mainly to bypass Ukraine and the duties it imposed on gas traffic from Russia to Europe. One of the main architects was Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor who preceded the rise of Angela Merkel, who after his term was called to head Gazprom's shareholder committee. 

But the influence of the Russian colossus in Germany did not stop there, on the contrary, it turned towards the world of sport, which became the preferred channel for exploiting its soft power through various sponsorships. In 2006, the Gelsenkirchen soccer team, Schalke 04, was chosen and a sponsorship agreement was stipulated for 125 million euros in the first 5 years. The choice of Schalke 04 was not accidental, as Gelsenkirchen is a key city in the German energy sector and one of the arrival points of the Nord Stream. Thanks to the Russian gas money, Schalke 04 has quickly become one of the best teams in the Bundesliga, closely battling with Bayern Munich. In the last 15 years Gazprom has been a constant presence on the kits of Schalke 04, getting paid over 30 million dollars even when the team was relegated to the second division last year. 

Yesterday, however, in light of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, the German club decided to remove the logo of the hydrocarbon giant from its jerseys and official uniforms, but has not yet officially terminated the rich sponsorship contract that will expire in June this year. Similar to what it did in Germany, Gazprom has had an agreement in Belgrade with Red Star since 2010. This, too, was not a choice dictated by the legendary history of the Serbian team, but because Gazprom's plans included another pipeline that would pass this time south to the Balkan peninsula. Compared to the partnership with Schalke 04, the one with Red Star did not achieve the desired results, also because the pipeline project was never completed. 

Before Schalke 04 and Red Star, Gazprom had already experimented with its sportswashing policy at home, purchasing Zenit St. Petersburg and relaunching the club in international soccer, building a futuristic stadium and winning the Europa League in 2009. The Gazprom Arena was supposed to host the Champions League final on May 28, in what would have been the crowning achievement of Gazprom's project in European soccer. The final, however, was moved by Uefa to the Stade de France in Paris, effectively breaking another contract stipulated by Gazprom. 

Premium Sponsor since 2012, Gazprom in these ten years has paid over 300 million dollars into the coffers of Uefa to link its logo to that of the most important continental competition. A relationship that has also resulted in the sponsorship for the matches of the FIFA national teams in view of Euro 2024, which will take place in Germany, and especially having been the main sponsor of the 2018 European Championship played in Russia. Now this link embarrasses in no small part the Uefa leadership, which immediately had to change the venue of the Champions League final and will soon have to decide also on the sponsorship that binds them to the Russian industry. Members of the European Union have in fact written to Uefa president Aleksander Čeferin asking him to "put an end to cooperation with Gazprom".

Gazprom in fact is not simply the undisputed leader of the Russian energy sector, but a direct emanation of the Kremlin government. Most of the company shares in fact belong to a department of the Russian Ministry of Economy, which uses gas to change geopolitical power relations. Even the key names of Gazprom are closely linked to the Russian government: Alexey Miller, the long-time CEO of the company, was also deputy energy minister while Dimitry Medvedev, the only federal president besides Putin in this millennium as well as owner of Zenit St. Petersburg, has always been at the top of Gazprom. It is no exaggeration to define the company, which according to Fortune has a turnover of about 130 billion dollars per year, as the sportwashing weapon of the Russian government. 

A strategy that has worked with great efficiency in the last decade, arriving in all major European stadiums through sponsors on shirts, billboards on the sidelines and commercials. Now the top management of soccer will have to decide whether to remain associated with this sponsor in order not to give up the important economic revenue or to dissociate themselves publicly, freeing themselves from the relationship with the Kremlin and finding other less compromising advertising subsidies.